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INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, a district court applied an affirmative defense to secondary 
patent infringement in a copyright infringement case.1  The court did so 
in order to protect a technology developer from copyright liability 
caused by third parties using the developer’s product in an infringing 
manner.2  The court’s intention was to avoid quashing a new technology 
that was capable of many noninfringing uses and, thus, to prevent an 
inequitable infringement judgment against an innovator solely because 
individuals, outside the developer’s control, used the product 
illegitimately.3  Over the next twenty-six years, district courts, courts of 
appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court have misinterpreted and disagreed 
with each other’s decisions—and even at times with their own 
decisions—over how to apply relevant principles of patent law in 
copyright cases, that is, to strike the proper balance between protecting 
copyright holders’ rights without restricting innovation.4  As the courts 
have battled over this issue, billions of dollars of infringement have 
occurred using new technology mediums, and once promising start-up 
companies have gone bankrupt because of copyright infringement 
judgments against them.5  As Justice Fortas so wisely said in addressing 
the new technology of cable television: 
[T]he fact that the Copyright Act was written in a different day, 
for different factual situations, should lead [the judiciary] to 
tread cautiously here.  Our major object, I suggest, should be to 
do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles 
and to business relationships, until the Congress legislates and 
relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties 
face.6 
Unfortunately, the courts have not tread with caution and have done 
much damage to the balance of copyright’s competing policies, which 
has left both copyright owners and technology innovators facing great 
uncertainty.  Accordingly, Congress must step in and combat this 
 
 1. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 
1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963, (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 2. See id. at 460–61. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright 
Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 5. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 920–21, 941, 
955–56 (2005). 
 6. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 404 (1968) (Fortas, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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uncertainty by codifying a modern version of the Staple Article of 
Commerce Doctrine’s affirmative defense (Staple Defense) into the 
Copyright Act. 
This Comment discusses the history and common law development 
of the Staple Defense, this author’s legislative proposal, and why such a 
proposal both clarifies the ambiguities caused by the current judicial 
doctrine and strikes the proper balance of the competing policies that 
underlie copyright. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE STAPLE DEFENSE7 
A.  Early Copyright Cases Tackle Dual-Use Technologies 
1.  Sony:  The Technology of Time-Shifting 
a.  The District Court’s Opinion:  The Staple Defense Sneaks into 
Copyright Law 
In Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, the copyright 
owners of publicly broadcast television shows sued the manufacturer 
and distributor of a videotape recording device, the corporations that 
sold and promoted the device, and a home user that operated the device 
for violations under the Copyright Act.8  First, the district court 
determined that the copyright owners could not establish direct 
infringement for home users recording publicly broadcast works 
because the court found “time-shifting” to be a fair use.9  Although the 
court’s finding ruled out holding the defendants liable for secondary 
liability, the district court, in dicta, explored the possibility of secondary 
liability if the home use was infringing use.10  In order to explore such 
possibilities, the district court surveyed the then current state of 
secondary liability.11  Because the Copyright Act was silent on secondary 
liability, the district court noted two cases that addressed contributory 
 
 7. It is instructive to note that patent law’s development of the Staple Defense is 
omitted from this Comment because it is irrelevant to implementing a practical application of 
the Defense in copyright law.  See, e.g., Brief of Professor Peter S. Menell et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10–11, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480).  In particular, 
the patent law defense arose out of the patent misuse doctrine in order to balance 
contributory liability and antitrust limitations on the patentee’s rights.  See id.  By enacting § 
271(c) of the Patent Act, Congress “immuniz[ed] the sale of staple articles of commerce from 
contributory liability” and, thus, “precluded patentees from leveraging their patents into the 
sale of unprotected technologies.”  See id. at 11. 
 8. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 432–33. 
 9. See id. at 456. 
 10. See id. at 457 (dicta). 
 11. See id. at 460. 
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liability for copyright infringement and distinguished them from the 
facts before the court.12  Specifically, the district court stated the 
following: 
 Plaintiffs’ claims are unprecedented.  Unlike the defendant in 
Gershwin, defendants here do not arrange for and direct the 
programming for the infringing activity.  Unlike the defendants 
in Screen Gems I and II, defendants here do not sell or advertise 
the infringing work.  Plaintiffs sue defendants because they 
manufacture, distribute, advertise and sell a product capable of a 
variety of uses, some of them allegedly infringing. 
 . . . . 
 Whether or not patent law has precedential value for 
copyright law and the Betamax is capable of “substantial” 
noninfringing use, the underlying rationale for the patent rule is 
significant.  Commerce would indeed be hampered if 
manufacturers of staple items were held liable as contributory 
infringers whenever they “constructively” knew that some 
purchasers on some occasions would use their product for a 
purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first 
impression, to be an infringement.13 
Finally, the court discussed the defendants’ hypothetical vicarious 
liability14 by noting they did not sufficiently participate in and benefit 
from home users recording publicly broadcast works to satisfy the 
requirements to be held liable under such claims.15 
b.  The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a different stance than the district 
court by holding that the act of home recording does not qualify as a fair 
use and thus is a direct infringement.16  The court found the defendants-
appellees to be contributorily liable for the direct infringement carried 
out by the home recording because they knew their device would be 
used to reproduce copyrighted works and “there [was] no doubt” they 
“induc[ed], caus[ed], or materially contribut[ed] to the infringing 
conduct.”17 
 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. at 460–61. 
 14. It appears as though the district court was not referring to vicarious liability as it is 
referred to today, but rather contributory infringement.  See id. at 462. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971–72 (9th Cir. 
1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 17. Id. at 975–76. 
REESE COMMENT   
448 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the district court’s dicta application of 
the Staple Defense by stating that “[v]ideotape recorders are 
manufactured, advertised, and sold for the primary purpose of 
reproducing television programming.  Virtually all television 
programming is copyrighted material.  Therefore, videotape recorders 
are not ‘suitable for substantial noninfringing use.’”18 
c.  The Supreme Court’s Opinion:  Mr. Rogers Sides with Technology 
and Five Justices Side with Mr. Rogers 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and after a tutorial on 
copyright policy, the Court embraced secondary liability as implied by 
the Copyright Act.19  The Supreme Court carefully presented the 
principle that finding secondary liability for copyright infringement 
increases the scope of the copyright holder’s monopoly and recognized 
the need to balance this augmentation so as not to “extend [the 
copyright holder’s] monopoly beyond the limits of [his or her] specific 
grant.”20  Accordingly, the Court cited patent law for the principle to 
combat this increase by “expressly provid[ing] that the sale of a ‘staple 
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use’ is not contributory [copyright] infringement.”21  As the stage was 
set, the Supreme Court stated that “the sale of copying equipment, like 
the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes.  Indeed, it need merely be capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses.”22 
Next, the Court jumped right into the deep end and asked whether 
the device at hand was “capable of commercially significant 
noninfringing uses.”23  However, in the same paragraph in which it 
posed that question, it refused to decide “how much use [would be] 
commercially significant”; instead, the Court found that the “potential 
use” of home users operating the device for time-shifting purposes met 
 
 18. Id. at 975 (citation omitted). 
 19. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (5-4 
decision) (“The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude 
the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not 
themselves engaged in the infringing activity.”). 
 20. Id. at 441. 
 21. Id. at 440 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)). 
 22. Id. at 442 (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. 
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the requisite threshold.24  In answering the aforementioned question, the 
Court found the use to be substantially noninfringing because plaintiffs-
respondents had a combined relevant market share of less than ten 
percent.25  With respect to the other ninety percent of the market share, 
the Supreme Court cited the district court’s injunctive relief findings to 
establish that “a significant quantity of broadcasting” had authorized 
time-shifting and “a significant potential for future authorized copying” 
existed.26  To further support this proposition, the Court cited the 
testimony of Mr. Rogers27—the defendants-petitioners’ star witness—
that he encouraged time-shifting by his viewers.28  Consequently, the 
Court held that copyright owners may not prevail in contributory 
liability claims unless the relief they request affects solely their 
copyrights or the copyright owner “speaks for virtually all copyright 
holders with an interest in the outcome.”29 
Finally, the Court found that “unauthorized home time-shifting” of 
publicly broadcast television shows was fair use and thus noninfringing.30  
Accordingly, because secondary liability requires a finding of the direct 
infringement, the Court held defendant-petitioners not liable for 
contributorily infringing plaintiffs-respondents’ copyrights.31 
i.  Justice Stevens’s Dicta 
Although the Court saw time-shifting for home users as a fair use 
and thus, technically, the opinion designated almost all use of the device 
as noninfringing, the Court’s alternative reasoning for protecting the 
defendant-petitioners vis-à-vis the Staple Defense lead to some 
quantitative reasoning by the Court.32  Specifically, the Court explained 
that the Betamax was capable of substantial noninfringing uses “both 
because [plaintiff-]respondents have no right to prevent other copyright 
holders from authorizing it for their programs, and . . . 
because . . . unauthorized home time-shifting . . . [was] legitimate fair 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. at 443. 
 26. Id. at 444. 
 27. Fred Rogers was president of the corporation that produced and owned the 
copyright to Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood, the popular children’s program in which he 
starred on the Public Broadcasting Service. 
 28. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 445–46 & n.27. 
 29. Id. at 446. 
 30. Id. at 442. 
 31. Id. at 456. 
 32. Id. at 445. 
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use.”33  Moreover, the Court stated that the defendant-petitioners 
“demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of 
copyright holders who license[d] their works for broadcast on free 
television would not [have] object[ed] to having their broadcasts time-
shifted by private viewers.”34  Consequently, this author makes the 
assumption that even if unauthorized time-shifting were not a fair use, 
authorized time-shifting was, individually, a substantial enough use of 
the Betamax to justify applying the Staple Defense.  Such reasoning 
requires some creative accounting on the part of this author to get to a 
range that approximates the Court’s interpretation of “substantial.” 
First, the plaintiffs-respondents had a market share “well below 
10%.”35  Disney had “one hour a week of network television and one 
syndicated series,” whereas Universal had “under 5%” in a major U.S. 
market.36  That leaves the range of approximately five to ten percent 
infringing use.  Accordingly, analysis continues to determine how much 
of the ninety to ninety-five percent figure one could categorize as 
noninfringing use. 
John Kenaston, Channel 58’s station manager, testified that out of 
the 107 programs on his station, “58% authorize[d] some home taping” 
and “almost 20% authorize[d] unrestricted home taping.”37  Assuming 
this sample was consistent with the other stations not party to this suit, 
then such a proposition adds twenty-two percent infringing use to the 
running total.  Moreover, the district court found that the “[d]efendants’ 
survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine 
to record programs they otherwise would have missed.”38  Thus, four 
percent used the Betamax for purposes other than time-shifting, which 
may have violated the restrictions of fifty-eight percent of the programs 
on Kenaston’s channel that “authorize some home taping.”39  As a 
result, this author adds another two percent to the running total of 
infringing uses.  In sum, this author calculates a total of approximately 
twenty-nine to thirty-four percent infringing uses and sixty-six to 
seventy-one percent noninfringing uses, thus defining a range for the 
Staple Defense. 
 
 33. Id. at 442 (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. at 456 (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. at 443. 
 36. Id. at 443 n.22. 
 37. Id. at 445. 
 38. Id. at 424 n.4. 
 39. Id. at 445 (emphasis added). 
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ii.  Justice Blackmun’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Blackmun—joined by three other justices—outlined the 
notion that “[w]hen the use is one that creates no benefit to the public at 
large, copyright protection should not be denied on the basis that a new 
technology that may result in harm has not yet done so.”40  Following 
this proposition, the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority that 
the patent law test “should be imported wholesale into copyright law.”41  
Instead, the dissenting justices proposed a modified test to remove 
uncertainty in its application.  Specifically, “if a significant portion of the 
product’s use is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers cannot be 
held contributorily liable for the product’s infringing uses.”42  However, 
“[i]f virtually all of the product’s use . . . is to infringe, contributory 
liability may be imposed; if no one would buy the product for 
noninfringing purposes alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is 
purposely profiting from the infringement, and that liability is 
appropriately imposed.”43 
In critiquing the majority’s “capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses” standard, the dissenting justices suggested that “[o]nly the most 
unimaginative manufacturer would be unable to demonstrate that a . . . 
product is ‘capable’ of substantial noninfringing uses.”44  Moreover, 
“[b]ecause of the Court’s conclusion concerning the legality of time-
shifting, it never addresse[d] the amount of noninfringing use that a 
manufacturer must show to absolve itself from liability as a contributory 
infringer.”45 
2.  RCA Records:  Controlling the Use of Copyrighted Works 
In the same year the Supreme Court decided Sony, the Southern 
District of New York applied the principles from Sony in a preliminary 
injunction hearing.46  In RCA Records v. All-Fast Systems, Inc., the 
plaintiffs owned copyrighted sound recordings, which they sold to the 
public on audiocassette tapes that the plaintiffs manufactured.47  The 
 
 40. Id. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 491. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 498. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 47. See id. at 336–37. 
REESE COMMENT   
452 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
defendant ran a neighborhood copy center that operated “a ‘Rezound’ 
cassette-copying machine.”48 
The plantiffs established that the defendant’s sales personnel sold 
blank Rezound-compatible tapes to its customers and then used the 
Rezound to copy the protected material from the plaintiffs’ cassette 
tapes to the Rezound tapes for a lesser cost to the customer than the 
retail purchase price of plaintiffs’ cassette tapes.49  Moreover, the district 
court had no doubt that the sales personnel “were well aware of both 
the copyrighted nature of the taped copies and the wrongfulness of the 
copying” because “a decal warning against such copyright was plastered 
on the machine.”50  Accordingly, the district court held that plaintiffs 
established a “likelihood of success on the merits” for a finding that the 
defendant directly infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights.51 
In determining the scope and terms of the injunction, the district 
court noted that the plaintiffs were “entitled” to a preliminary 
injunction, which prevented any direct infringement of plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works and also any contributory infringement involving the 
defendant’s customers using the Rezound to make copies on their own 
accord.52  Such prevention of contributory infringement would have 
required the defendant to cease “selling Rezound cassettes—the only 
type of cassette which [could] be successfully used in [the] Rezound—to 
customers who the defendants” knew or had a reasonable belief would 
use the Rezound to copy the plaintiffs’ copyrighted materials.53  In 
response, the defendants claimed that the Rezound was “capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses” and, therefore, the injunction could not 
extend to prevent contributory infringement because it would prevent 
their legal use of the Rezound.54 
In its interpretation of Sony, the district court held that the Staple 
Defense “extends protection only to the manufacturer of the infringing 
machine, not to its operator.”55  The district court reasoned that 
contributory liability had been “traditionally” imposed on “those who 
were ‘in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and 
 
 48. Id. at 337. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 338. 
 52. See id. at 338–39. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 
(1984)). 
 55. Id. 
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had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner.’”56  
Accordingly, the manufacturer of the Rezound lacked “such control 
once the machine [was] sold”; however, the defendant was “aware of 
each use of the machine” and could have “control[led] its customers’ 
infringing activities.”57 
The court found—for purposes of the preliminary injunction—that 
the Rezound was capable of substantial noninfringing uses and 
“requiring [the] defendant to avoid contributory infringement” would 
not be “an undue burden on its right to pursue those” noninfringing 
uses.58  In contrast, “[t]he manufacturer of the machine ma[de] but one 
commercial choice:  to sell or not to sell its machine.”59  Therefore, the 
court held that if it found the manufacturer liable for contributory 
infringement, then it would impose a “substantial burden” because the 
only way the manufacturer could cease the infringing use would be to 
halt selling the Rezound.60  As a result, although the court enjoined the 
defendant from directly or contributorily infringing plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works, the court refused to seize the machine because such 
an order would “prevent the legitimate and socially beneficent uses of 
the Rezound.”61 
The district court later awarded a permanent injunction and 
statutory damages to the plaintiffs.62  The defendant did not file an 
appeal. 
3.  Vault Corp.:  The Defendant Wins One 
a.  The District Court’s Decision 
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., the plaintiff owned the 
copyright in a software program called “PROLOK,” which had a 
security measure that prevented users from making working copies of 
PROLOK.63  The defendant developed a software program called 
“CopyWrite,” which allowed users to make working copies of 
 
 56. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 440). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 340. 
 62. See RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., No. 84 Civ. 631-CSH, 1985 WL 3059, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1985). 
 63. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 752 (E.D. La. 1987), aff’d, 
847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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PROLOK.64  The plaintiff moved to preliminarily enjoin the defendant 
from, inter alia, marketing or selling the portion of CopyWrite, which 
unlocked the security feature of PROLOK and “infring[ed ] or 
contributorily infring[ed ]” the plaintiff’s copyright in PROLOK.65  The 
owner of the defendant corporation testified at trial that the only 
function of RAMKEY—that is, the feature in CopyWrite, which 
actually unlocked PROLOK’s security—was to create copies of material 
on copy-protected disks.66 
With respect to direct infringement, the plaintiff claimed (1) that the 
defendant’s employees made an unauthorized copy of plaintiff’s work in 
temporary memory every time those employees booted PROLOK in 
their computers and (2) that RAMKEY was an unauthorized derivative 
work of PROLOK.67  Furthermore, the plaintiff argued the defendant 
was contributorily liable for CopyWrite users making unauthorized 
copies of PROLOK.68 
The district court held that the defendant did not make such 
unauthorized copies of PROLOK as the plaintiff claimed because § 117 
of the Copyright Act exempted such use as an “essential step in the 
utilization” of PROLOK.69  Moreover, the district court held that 
although the defendant copied thirty characters of code from PROLOK 
to develop RAMKEY, such use did not substantially incorporate 
enough of PROLOK to constitute preparing a derivative work.70 
The district court erroneously held71 that the plaintiff lacked standing 
to bring suit for contributory infringement against the defendant, but 
alternatively found that the defendant would not have been liable for 
contributory infringement if standing existed because CopyWrite was 
“cable of ‘commercially significant noninfringing uses,’ such as [(1)] 
making archival copies of software programs as allowed by Section 
117(2) of the Copyright Act,” (2) “mak[ing] copies of unprotected 
software,” and (3) diagnosing “the quality” of software.72  Accordingly, 
 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. at 757. 
 66. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 67. Vault Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 758. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 117). 
 70. See id. at 759. 
 71. See Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 262–63. 
 72. Vault Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 759 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984)). 
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the district court did not grant the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction against the defendant.73 
b.  The Fifth Circuit’s Decision 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion that the 
defendant-appellee did not directly infringe the plaintiff-appellant’s 
copyright in PROLOK by making unauthorized copies or preparing 
unauthorized derivative works of PROLOK.74  In addition, the Fifth 
Circuit agreed with the district court’s reasoning regarding such alleged 
direct infringement.75  Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s finding that the defendant-appellee did not contributorily 
infringe the plaintiff-appellant’s copyright in PROLOK, the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning differed from that of the district court.76 
Contrary to the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff-
appellant had standing for contributory infringement claims against the 
defendant-appellee.77  Moreover, because the plaintiff-appellant was 
only seeking to enjoin the defendant-appellee from advertising the 
RAMKEY portions of CopyWrite and because RAMKEY was 
separable from CopyWrite, the issue of whether the defendant-appellee 
contributorily infringed plaintiff-appellant’s copyright hinged on 
“whether the RAMKEY feature ha[d] substantial noninfringing uses.”78 
The Fifth Circuit found that copies of PROLOK made with a non-
RAMKEY version of CopyWrite did not allow users to create archives 
of PROLOK, which were “fully functional” replacements of the original 
disks.79  Specifically, the copies of PROLOK, which a non-RAMKEY 
version of CopyWrite would create, could not be used without the 
original PROLOK disks and, thus, could not be used if the originals 
became corrupt or lost.80  However, archival copies of PROLOK that 
were made with versions of CopyWrite, which had RAMKEY, could be 
used without the original disks.81  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held 
that “[b]ecause § 117(2) [of the Copyright Act] permit[ted] the making 
of fully functional archival copies,” RAMKEY was “capable of 
 
 73. See id. at 764. 
 74. See Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 261, 268. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 261–67. 
 77. Id. at 262–63. 
 78. Id. at 263–64 (emphasis added). 
 79. See id. at 264. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
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substantial noninfringing uses”; thus, the defendant-appellee did not 
contributorily infringe the plaintiff-appellant’s copyright.82 
B.  The Next Generation of Infringement:  The Peer-to-Peer Network 
Cases 
1.  Napster:  Sampling and Space-Shifting 
a.  The District Court’s Decision83 
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the defendant distributed a 
free software program, which allowed Internet users to freely upload 
and download, inter alia, Moving Pictures Expert Group Layer 3 files, 
more commonly known by its file extension as MP3 files.84  The 
defendant’s software program uploaded a list of the names of the MP3 
files, which were shared on a user’s hard drive, to the defendant’s main 
server.85  Next, this information was shared with the other users on the 
defendant’s network and those users could then “locate music by their 
favorite artists in MP3 format.”86  Once located, the main server would 
point the individual user’s software client to the “host” user’s 
computer—via its Internet Protocol (IP) address—which housed the 
MP3 file that the individual user requested, so the user could download 
the file.87  In addition, users had the option of “hotlisting” each other so 
they could browse and download MP3 files directly from each others’ 
libraries.88  In sum, the defendant’s servers only stored a list of names of 
the songs that each user shared along with each user’s IP address.89  The 
content—that is, the copyright protected work—was transferred over 
the Internet directly between the users and was not stored on 
defendant’s servers.90  Most impressively, this service had approximately 
seventy-five million users.91 
 
 82. Id. at 267. 
 83. The district court made other rulings before ruling on the preliminary injunction; 
however, Judge Patel’s opinion regarding the preliminary injunction is the only such ruling 
that is within the scope of this Comment. 
 84. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 85. Id. at 901. 
 86. Id. (citation omitted). 
 87. Id. at 905. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. at 907. 
 91. See id. at 902. 
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The plaintiffs, made up of eighteen record companies, moved for a 
preliminary injunction against the defendant’s peer-to-peer software 
service to enjoin it “from engaging in or assisting others in copying, 
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted music 
without the express permission of the rights owner.”92  To support their 
motion, the plaintiffs’ expert witness calculated that eighty-seven 
percent of the files transferred using the defendant’s software were 
copyrighted, and counsel for the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) determined that the plaintiffs collectively owned the 
copyrights of approximately seventy percent of the files transferred.93 
In the district court’s vicarious and contributory liability analysis, it 
found that users of the defendant’s service directly infringed the 
plaintiffs’ copyrights by partaking in unauthorized distribution and 
reproduction of plaintiffs’ works.94  Next, the district court addressed the 
defendant’s Staple Defense.95  The district court stated that “Sony stands 
for the rule that a manufacturer is not liable for selling a ‘staple article 
of commerce’ that is ‘capable of commercially significant noninfringing 
uses.’”96  The defendant argued what it felt were three noninfringing 
uses that its peer-to-peer software network was capable of achieving:  
“sampling, space-shifting, and the authorized distribution of new artists’ 
work.”97 
The district court found that sampling and space-shifting98 were 
clearly infringement under the Copyright Act unless such activities were 
found to be fair uses.99  The court then held both types of activities not 
to be fair uses.100  Specifically, the court found sampling not to be a fair 
use because, inter alia, a “user who downloads a copy of a song to her 
 
 92. Id. at 900. 
 93. Id. at 903.  Counsel for the RIAA used the data sample from the plaintiffs’ expert 
witness to make that determination.  See id. 
 94. See id. at 911. 
 95. See id. at 912. 
 96. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984)). 
 97. Id. at 913.  This same language is included in the “New Artists Program,” which the 
defendant launched after the plaintiffs filed suit in this case.  Although the injunction did not 
seek to enjoin this feature of the program, the court dismissed it as “not a major aspect of the 
Napster business plan[;] . . . bona fide new artists constituted a very small percentage of music 
available on Napster.”  Id. at 917. 
 98. Space-shifting consisted of the act of a user accessing a sound recording through the 
defendant’s service, which the user legitimately owned in another format. 
 99. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 100. See id. 
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hard drive may make that song available to millions of other individuals, 
even if she eventually chooses to purchase the CD”; that is, the court 
feared that “[s]o-called sampling on Napster may quickly facilitate 
unauthorized distribution at an exponential rate.”101  With respect to 
space-shifting, the court further entertained the idea that even if it was a 
fair use, as time-shifting was found to be in Sony, space-shifting did not 
represent enough of a use; in particular, such use was the “occasional 
use” of the defendants’ software program.102  The court further declined 
to extend the Staple Defense because the defendant “maintain[ed] and 
supervise[d]” the “system that users must access to upload or download 
files.”103  In other words, the court refused to extend the doctrine in a 
situation where “the defendant continue[d] to exercise control over the 
device’s use.”104 
As a result, the district court held that the plaintiffs showed a 
“reasonable likelihood of success” on their contributory and vicarious 
liability claims and granted their preliminary injunction motion against 
the defendant.105 
b.  Chief Judge Patel’s Dicta 
Confident with its decision, the district court dovetailed its reasoning 
with both the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s expert data by stating, in dicta, 
that “even if space-shifting [was] a fair-use it [was] not substantial 
enough to preclude liability under the” Staple Defense.106  In particular, 
the court noted that the defendant’s expert testified that seventy percent 
of its users “at least sometimes engage in space-shifting.”107  However, 
the defendant’s expert’s report stated that “more than a third of Napster 
users (36.3%) always or frequently use[d] Napster to download digital 
music files of songs that they had previously purchased in another 
format” and “[a]nother 34.6% sometimes engage[d] in this practice of 
space[-]shifting.”108  Although “sometimes” is a vague quantity, the 
survey shows that space-shifting comprises between 36.3% and 70.9% of 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 916. 
 103. Id. at 917. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 920, 922, 927. 
 106. Id. at 916 (dicta) (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. (dicta). 
 108. Expert Report of Peter S. Fader, Ph.D. ¶ 77, Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (Nos. C 
99-5183 MHP, C 00-0074 MHP), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/ 
hdocs/docs/napster/napster/fader_070300.pdf. 
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the use.109  It is instructive to note, of course, that the word “sometimes” 
would greatly decrease the 34.6% value and, thus, the space-shifting use 
was likely much closer to 36.3% than 70.9%.110  In contrast, the 
plaintiffs’ expert report allowed this author to extract a range of 
approximately 17.8% to 32.9% of college students surveyed who space-
shifted.111  Because the court was confident that it was correct under 
both experts’ analyses, the court, by inference, stated that even if a 
device has 36.3%112 noninfringing uses, that was not enough to be 
“substantial” under the Staple Defense.113 
c.  The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on all issues but one:  its 
interpretation of the Staple Defense.114  Like the court in Sony and this 
district court, the Ninth Circuit refused to attach a quantitative value to 
the Staple Defense.115  However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the 
district court that the defendant-appellant “failed to demonstrate that 
its system [was] capable of commercially significant uses” because “[t]he 
 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Report of E. Deborah Jay, Ph.D. at 10, 21, Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (Nos. C 99-
5183 MHP, C 00-0074 MHP), 2000 WL 34744110.  The total number of students surveyed was 
500.  See id.  According to Table 7, 48.3% already owned less than 10% of the songs they 
downloaded; 17.2% already owned between 10 and 25% of the songs they downloaded; 
15.6% already owned between 26 and 50% of the songs they downloaded; 10.6% already 
owned between 51 and 75% of the songs they downloaded; 3.4% already owned between 76 
and 99% of the songs they downloaded; 2.4% already owned 100% of the songs they 
downloaded; and 2.2% were unsure how many of the songs they downloaded were songs they 
already owned.  See id. at 21. 
 This author then converted these figures into raw numbers—that is, multiplying each 
percent by 500 (the sample size).  See id.  Next, this author multiplied each raw number by the 
floor and ceiling of its respective range.  See id.  For example, of the 48.3% that already 
owned less than 10% of the songs they downloaded, this author converted 48.3% into the raw 
number 243 and multiplied 243 by the floor of the range, which is 0%, and the ceiling of the 
range, which is 10%.  See id.  This author gave the unsure subjects a floor of 0% and a ceiling 
of 100%.  See id.   Next, this author added up the floor values and divided the aggregate floor 
value by the sample size.  See id.  The resulting value is the floor of the range referenced in 
the text of this Comment.  Last, this author added up the ceiling values and divided the 
aggregate ceiling value by the sample size.  See id.  The resulting value is the ceiling of the 
range referenced in the text of this Comment.  See id. 
 112. This is the floor value and, thus, does not take into account the additional 34.6% of 
users who “sometimes” space-shift because of the arbitrary decision that this author would 
have to make to include said additional value. 
 113. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (by implication). 
 114. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 115. See id. 
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district court improperly confined the use analysis to current uses, 
ignoring the system’s capabilities.”116  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
criticized the district court for failing to give weight “to current and 
future noninfringing use.”117 
Notwithstanding the district court’s erroneous interpretation of the 
Staple Defense, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s 
decision that “plaintiffs[-appellees] would likely prevail in establishing 
that” the defendant-appellant “knew or had reason to know of its users’ 
infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights.”118  Analogizing to the pre-Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) case Religious Technology Center 
v. Netcom On-line Communication Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held 
that “if a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material 
available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, 
the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringing.”119  
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit noted that “absent any specific 
information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system 
operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because 
the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted 
material.”120 
Finally, the court went on to conclude that the defendant-appellant 
had “actual knowledge that specific infringing material [was] available 
using its system” and had the ability to deny access to infringers but 
decided not to take such action.121  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s finding regarding contributory infringement.122  In its 
affirmation of the district court’s vicarious liability ruling, the Ninth 
Circuit explained that a proper interpretation of Sony led the court to 
the conclusion that the Staple Defense was only for contributory 
infringement and not for vicarious liability.123 
 
 116. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 
(1984)) (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. (citing Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. 
Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). 
 120. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436, 442–43). 
 121. Id. at 1022 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920–21 
(N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 122. Id. at 1021–22. 
 123. Id. at 1022 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 434–35; 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][2], [2][b] (2000)). 
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As a result, the defendant-appellant settled the suit for thirty-six 
million dollars, and with a fifty million dollar loan, it restructured to 
implement a new business model of distributing authorized music on its 
system.124  The defendant-appellant received access to over 700,000 
songs from various major recording labels to legitimately distribute 
through a modified electronic system.125 
2.  In re Aimster:  The Mere Potential for Noninfringing Use 
a.  The District Court’s Opinion 
In the case of In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, the plaintiffs 
owned the copyrights in the sound recordings and underlying 
compositions of almost all of the popular music in America.126  The 
defendants developed, operated, and maintained a peer-to-peer file-
sharing service called “Aimster,” which allowed users with an Internet 
connection to share any file they had access to on their personal 
computers.127  Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin 
the defendants from contributorily and vicariously infringing the 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.128 
The district court described the defendants’ system in detail.129  First, 
Internet users went to Aimster’s Web site and downloaded the Aimster 
software for free or “Club Aimster” software for a membership charge 
of $4.95 each month.130  After downloading the software, the users were 
then able to install the Aimster software on their personal computers.131 
When the user ran Aimster, the software would “piggyback” on 
America Online’s instant messaging network, using the network as the 
server, which connected all Aimster users to each other.132  The user had 
to enter a login and password, which he or she had to register with the 
Aimster service before being able to browse other users’ files.133  
 
 124. Brad King, Napster Settles, Eyes Relaunch, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 24, 2001, available 
at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/1,47075-0.html. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 127. See id. at 638. 
 128. See id. at 646. 
 129. See id. at 634–46. 
 130. Id. at 642, 645.  At the time of the litigation, the defendants required users to join 
“Club Aimster” in order to use the software.  Id. at 645. 
 131. See id. at 642. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
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Aimster acted like anabolic steroids for the file transfer functions of 
America Online’s instant messenger services.134  First, the user would 
designate the files to which he or she had access and that he or she 
wanted to share with other Aimster users.135  Next, the Aimster software 
would communicate this information to a database index on Aimster’s 
server.136  Finally, the Aimster software gave each of its users, without 
any restrictions, the ability to, inter alia,137 search for any file that any 
specific Aimster user or all Aimster users had available for sharing at 
that point in time and the ability to directly download the files that were 
available.138 
The Aimster server was in constant communication with the Aimster 
software to facilitate the searches; however, each user stored his or her 
own files on his or her own personal computer and the actual transfer of 
the files occurred directly between the computers of Aimster users.139  
The Aimster software encrypted the files for such direct transfers and 
then decrypted the files once the transferee completed the download.140  
Moreover, although any person with the Aimster software could view 
the files each Aimster user designated as available for distribution, the 
encryption scheme prevented any individuals from conclusively 
determining that any specific material had actually transferred between 
two Aimster users.141  Nonetheless, the plaintiffs’ agents were able to 
download “every single recording on the November 3, 2001 Billboard 
Hot 100,” and “every single Top 10 recording from the period between 
November 5, 2000 and November 3, 2001.”142  Moreover, the defendants’ 
Aimster Web site linked to a tutorial called “Guardian” (Guardian 
Tutorial) that detailed how one would go about downloading 
copyrighted works using the Aimster software;143 users posted messages 
on Aimster message boards, inter alia, requesting or offering 
copyrighted works and bad mouthing the recording industry; and the 
Aimster software presented Club Aimster users with links to download 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 641. 
 136. See id. 
 137. In addition, Aimster users could instant message each other.  Id. 
 138. See id. at 642. 
 139. See id. at 643. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. at 646. 
 143. Id. at 643. 
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the forty “most frequently downloaded” songs, the copyrights of which 
happened to be owned by the plaintiffs.144 
The court commenced its liability analysis by exploring the direct 
infringement of the Aimster users as a necessary first ingredient for any 
secondary liability.145  The defendants did not dispute “the existence of 
direct infringement by Aimster’s users,” but instead argued that the 
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 shielded the Aimster users from 
liability.146  The court rejected the defendants’ argument and continued 
to analyze the defendants’ secondary liability for the Aimster users’ 
direct infringement.147 
The district court found that the plaintiffs “demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits for” defendants to be contributory 
infringers.148  With respect to the requisite knowledge, the district court 
found that the (1) letters from the RIAA to the defendants 
demonstrating the availability of copyrighted works on Aimster, (2) 
Guardian Tutorial, (3) message boards discussing the availability of—
and requests for—copyrighted materials and anti-copyright messages, 
and (4) defendants’ “operation of Club Aimster all demonstrate . . . 
[their] actual knowledge of the infringing activity.”149  Furthermore, the 
court conceded that although “the actual transfers between users are 
unknown to [d]efendants due to Aimster’s encryption scheme,” the 
encryption did “not prevent [d]efendants from having constructive 
knowledge.”150  With respect to the requisite contribution, the district 
court held that the defendants provided “the support services necessary 
for individual Aimster users to connect with each other,” thus providing 
the services necessary for the users to distribute copyrighted materials.151  
Moreover, Club Aimster provided an interface for users to point-and-
click their way to downloading the plaintiffs’ most popular copyrighted 
works.152  The court noted that the “[d]efendants manage[d] to do 
everything but actually steal the music off the store shelf and hand it to 
Aimster’s users.”153 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 648. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at 649. 
 148. Id. at 654. 
 149. Id. at 650. 
 150. Id. at 651. 
 151. Id. at 652. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. 
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The defendants claimed, inter alia, that they could not be held liable 
for contributory infringement because Aimster was “capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses.”154  The defendants argued such uses 
included the following:  (1) “the ability of Aimster users to transfer . . . 
non-copyrighted files and messages to other users”; (2) “the ability of 
users to identify other users with similar interests, share information, 
and develop clubs”; and (3) the ability of “businesses without a network 
administrator . . . to exchange business records securely and 
efficiently.”155 
First, the district court rejected this defense because of its very 
narrow interpretation of Sony to mean that in order for the defendants 
to take safe harbor under the Staple Defense, the defendants had to 
show that the noninfringing use of their device was the “primary use” 
because in Sony, time-shifting was the “principal use” of the Betamax.156  
The district court noted that even if the defendants presented evidence 
that the Aimster users used the service for legitimate and noninfringing 
purposes, “the mere inclusion of such evidence would not suffice unless 
[the evidence] tended to show that such use constituted Aimster’s 
primary use.”157  Second, the district court noted that “Sony only applied 
to a ‘staple article of commerce,’” that is, an item distributed to 
“customers who thereafter use the machine as they see fit.”158  
Accordingly, the district court described Aimster as a “service” that 
“involve[d] an ongoing relationship between the direct infringers (the 
users) and the contributory infringers (the [d]efendants),” and, 
therefore, the district court held that Aimster was not a staple article of 
commerce.159  Third, the district court found “that Aimster [was] a 
service specifically designed to aid the infringing activities of its users 
and, on that basis alone, should not be eligible for Sony’s protections.”160  
Finally, the district court found that the Supreme Court in Sony placed 
great emphasis on “the district court’s finding that Sony had not 
‘influenced or encouraged’ the unlawful copies.”161  Consequently, the 
 
 154. Id. at 653 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 654. 
 161. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438 
(1984)). 
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court held that the defendants in the case at bar went “to great lengths 
to both influence and encourage the direct infringement among its 
users” and, thus, listed the final grounds for rejecting the Staple 
Defense.162 
Furthermore, the district court found that even if the plaintiffs failed 
to demonstrate “a likelihood of success on the contributory 
infringement claim,” the court would have found “a likelihood of 
success on the vicarious infringement claim.”163  Specifically, the 
defendants “control[led] the access of Aimster’s users” and, thus, could 
have terminated such access when users hosted infringing material.164  
Although, the defendants argued that their encryption scheme 
prevented them from knowing users’ Internet protocol addresses, the 
court held that the “right and ability to control” does not “require . . . 
such precise identifying knowledge.”165  In addition, the district court 
identified the defendants’ direct financial interest in the underlying 
infringing activity as including:  (1) the monthly fee it received for Club 
Aimster membership, (2) the donations it received for fighting the 
recording industry, and (3) the sales from merchandise on Aimster’s 
Web site.166 
The district court went on to discuss the defendants’ eligibility for 
the liability safe harbors in the DMCA.167  First, the district court stated 
that Aimster qualifies as a “service provider” under the DMCA.168  
Second, the court noted that the defendants adopted a “repeat infringer 
policy”; however, the defendants never implemented the policy because 
they claimed the encryption scheme kept them from discovering users 
who actually transferred copyrighted files.169  Nevertheless, the court 
found that knowing a particular user’s Internet protocol address is not 
necessary; “[r]ather, the statute merely provides that the service 
provider implement a policy that provides for the termination of access 
to repeat infringers in ‘appropriate circumstances.’”170  Accordingly, the 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 655. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. at 656. 
 168. Id. at 657. 
 169. Id. at 659. 
 170. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)). 
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district court held that the DMCA did not provide a safe harbor for the 
defendants.171 
The district court concluded by granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction; however, it requested that the plaintiffs draft 
such injunctive language only to restrict the defendants’ contributorily 
infringing activities, but not any noninfringing uses.172  Nevertheless, 
according to the Seventh Circuit, “[t]he district judge entered a broad 
preliminary injunction, which had the effect of shutting down the 
Aimster service.”173 
b.  The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the 
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs-appellees.174  Even so, the 
Seventh Circuit detailed its position on, inter alia, applying the Staple 
Defense to contributory copyright liability.175 
The Seventh Circuit stated that “the producer of a product that has 
substantial noninfringing uses is not a contributory infringer merely 
because some of the uses actually made of the product are infringing.”176  
To illustrate, the court turned to Sony where, in that case, the Betamax 
had three principal uses involving copying:  (1) time-shifting, (2) “library 
building,” and (3) commercial skipping.177  The Seventh Circuit noted 
that the Sony Court held that the first use was a fair use; however, the 
second and third uses were, according to the Seventh Circuit, 
“unquestionably infringing to the extent that the programs copied were 
under copyright and the taping of them was not authorized.”178  As a 
result, customers were using the Betamax “for a mixture of infringing 
and noninfringing uses and the [Supreme] Court thought that Sony 
could not demix them because once Sony sold the [Betamax] it lost all 
control over its use.”179 
Even though the majority in Sony did not discuss that Sony could 
have developed the Betamax in a way that would have allowed 
 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 666. 
 173. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 174. See id. at 656. 
 175. See id. at 648. 
 176. Id. at 647 (citations omitted). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 648 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
438 (1984)). 
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broadcasters to “scrambl[e] their signals to disable the Betamax from 
recording their programs,” the Seventh Circuit noted that the court 
would factor “the ability of a service provider to prevent its customers 
from infringing” in determining contributory liability.180  Still, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that it would not be “a controlling factor.”181  For 
instance, “[i]f a service facilitate[d] both infringing and noninfringing 
uses . . . and the detection and prevention of the infringing uses would 
be highly burdensome,” then recognizing the mere ability to prevent 
infringement as a dispositive factor for denying application of the Staple 
Defense would “result in the shutting down of the service.”182 
The Seventh Circuit noted that the majority in Sony “acknowledged 
that 25 percent of Betamax users were fast forwarding through 
commercials,” that is, the Betamax users were preparing infringing 
derivative works.183  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
plaintiffs-appellants’ claim that the Staple Defense does not apply to 
alleged contributory infringers when there is “more than a mere 
showing that a product may be used for infringing purposes.”184  In 
addition, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Napster “that 
actual knowledge of specific infringing uses [was] a sufficient condition 
for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer.”185 
The court addressed the defendant-appellant’s argument that it 
lacked sufficient knowledge for contributory infringement because 
Aimster’s encryption scheme prevented the defendant-appellant from 
actually knowing the content of any file transfer between the Aimster 
users.186  The court rejected this argument by stating that “[w]illful 
blindness is knowledge, in copyright law . . . as it is in the law 
generally.”187  The court was careful to avoid holding that a service’s use 
of encryption would prohibit application of the Staple Defense, but that 
“using encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful 
purposes for which the service [was] being used” would prohibit such an 
application.188 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 648–49. 
 183. Id. at 649 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 452 n.36). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 
2000)). 
 186. Id. at 650. 
 187. Id. (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 188. Id. at 650–51. 
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With respect to the showing necessary for the Staple Defense, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that the mere potential of noninfringing uses 
would not satisfy the test; otherwise, almost all alleged contributory 
infringers eligible for the Staple Defense “would be immune from 
liability for contributory infringement.”189  The Seventh Circuit 
articulated that if such reasoning was inaccurate, the Supreme Court 
would not “have thought it important to say that the Betamax was used 
‘principally’ for time shifting.”190 
The court then listed the affirmative steps the defendant-appellant 
took to invite copyright infringement of plaintiffs-appellees’ works, 
including, for instance, the Guardian Tutorial and Club Aimster.191  The 
court stated that such evidence is not dispositive toward rejecting the 
Staple Defense; however, the defendant-appellant would bear the 
“burden of production . . . to demonstrate that its service has substantial 
noninfringing uses.”192  Although the Seventh Circuit listed five potential 
noninfringing uses of Aimster, it rephrased the issue as to how 
“probable” the occurrence of such uses would be.193  Consequently, the 
defendant-appellant did not present any evidence to the 
aforementioned issue because its encryption scheme prevented the 
gathering of such evidence.194  As a result, the Seventh Circuit assumed 
there was no evidence and, thus, held that the district court was correct 
in its contributory infringement analysis.195 
c.  Judge Posner’s Dicta 
In dicta, the Seventh Circuit proposed a cost-benefit analysis to 
summarize its discussion regarding the applicability of liability immunity 
for “file-sharing service[s].”196  Specifically, “[e]ven where there are 
noninfringing uses, . . . if the infringing uses are substantial, then to 
avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service 
must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to 
eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses.”197 
 
 189. Id. at 651. 
 190. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 
(1984)). 
 191. See id. at 652. 
 192. Id. (citations omitted). 
 193. See id. at 653. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. (dicta). 
 197. Id. (dicta). 
REESE COMMENT   
2007] FIXING THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIXATION 469 
 
3.  Grokster:  Promoting Use for Infringement 
a.  The District Court’s Opinion 
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the 
plaintiffs owned the copyrights in much of the popular American 
musical recordings and compositions.198  The defendants provided two 
distinct software programs for connecting users via peer-to-peer 
networks.199  Because the parties did not dispute any material facts, both 
parties moved for summary judgment.200  The plaintiffs claimed that 
defendants contributorily and vicariously infringed their copyrights and 
the defendants denied that they were eligible for such liabilities.201 
Both technologies had inherent similarities.202  For instance, Internet 
users could freely download either software program—StreamCast or 
Grokster—from the Web site of the defendant that developed the 
particular software program.203  The users would then install the 
program that they downloaded and would designate which files they 
wanted to share with other users.204  Next, the users would execute the 
software program and “automatically connect[] to a peer-to-peer 
network (FastTrack in Grokster’s case; Gnutella in the case of 
Morpheus).”205  All files that the users designated for sharing would be 
available to all other users connected to the respective peer-to-peer 
network.206  The users were able to search for specific files that 
“match[ed] the search criteria” and then “click on a specific listing to 
initiate a direct transfer from the source computer to the requesting 
user’s computer.”207  Once downloaded, an identical replica of the 
original file existed on the requesting user’s computer.208   
Moreover, “[m]ultiple . . . uploads . . . or . . . downloads . . . [could] 
occur simultaneously to and from a single user’s computer.”209  
Furthermore, neither StreamCast nor Grokster “operate[d] a 
 
 198. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031–
32 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. at 1031. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. at 1031–33, 1039–41. 
 203. See id. at 1032. 
 204. See id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 1032–33. 
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centralized file-sharing [or indexing] network.”210  That is, when users 
searched for or transferred files with either a Grokster or StreamCast 
client, no data traveled through any computers or servers under the 
defendants’ control or ownership.211  In addition, both software 
programs had additional features for “organizing, viewing and playing 
media files, and for communicating with other users.”212 
The technologies, however, had many differences.213  For instance, 
Grokster licensed a proprietary software technology and did not have 
access to the source code; therefore, it lacked the means to “alter it in 
any way.”214  Grokster did have the ability to change the “start page” of 
the software client “and provide advertising automatically received by 
the Grokster client software.”215  In contrast, StreamCast “owned and 
controlled” its proprietary software program and, thus, “has access to 
the source code . . . to modify the software at will.”216  Moreover, 
Grokster’s peer-to-peer technology operated through “a two-tiered 
organizational structure, with groups of nodes217 clustered around a 
single supernode”218 to enable network access.219  A user who ran 
Grokster would immediately be connected to the network via a 
supernode and all search requests and results would be “relayed among 
supernodes, maximizing the breadth of the search pool and minimizing 
redundancy in search traffic.”220  Grokster was “preset with a list of ‘root 
supernodes’ . . . .  While Grokster may briefly have had some control 
over a root supernode, [p]laintiffs [did] not dispute that Grokster no 
longer operate[d] such a supernode.”221  In contrast, StreamCast 
operated through a one-tiered organizational structure whereby 
StreamCast clients would bounce search requests “from user to user 
until a match [was] found or the search request expire[d].”222 
 
 210. Id. at 1039. 
 211. Id. at 1040–41. 
 212. Id. at 1033. 
 213. See id. at 1039–41. 
 214. Id. at 1039. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1041. 
 217. The term “node” means “an end-point on the Internet, typically a user’s 
computer.”  Id. at 1040. 
 218. The term “supernode” means “a node that has a heightened function, 
accumulating information from numerous other nodes.”  Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1041. 
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To commence its infringement analysis, the district court noted that 
it was “undisputed” that “at least some” users of both the defendants’ 
software programs distributed and reproduced the plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works; therefore, the requisite underlying direct 
infringement existed for continuing its secondary liability analysis.223  
For contributory infringement, the court rephrased the knowledge 
inquiry as requiring the defendants to have had “actual knowledge of 
specific infringement [not the general occurrence of infringement] . . .  at 
a time when either [d]efendant materially contribute[d] to the alleged 
infringement, and [could] therefore do something about it.”224  The 
district court reasoned that Grokster and StreamCast had “substantial 
noninfringing uses,” such as: 
distributing movie trailers, free songs or other non-copyrighted 
works; using the software in countries where it is 
legal; . . . sharing the works of Shakespeare[; and] . . . search[ing] 
for public domain materials, government documents, media 
content for which distribution is authorized, . . . and computer 
software for which distribution is permitted.225 
Thus, by following the Ninth Circuit’s language in Napster, the district 
court concluded that “[a]bsent any specific information which identifies 
infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be held liable for 
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system 
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”226  Accordingly, the 
district court’s analysis continued to address “whether Grokster and 
StreamCast [did] anything, aside from distributing software, to actively 
facilitate—or whether they could [have done] anything to stop—their 
users’ infringing activity.”227  The district court concluded that 
defendants did not contribute to any of their users’ infringing activity 
because neither defendant provided any centralized server for 
facilitating any searches or transfers of data on the peer-to-peer 
networks.228  In short, “[if] either [d]efendant closed their doors and 
deactivated all computers within their control, users of their products 
could continue sharing files with little or no interruption.”229  Moreover, 
 
 223. Id. at 1034. 
 224. Id. at 1038. 
 225. Id. at 1035–36. 
 226. Id. at 1036 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 227. Id. at 1039. 
 228. Id. at 1041. 
 229. Id. 
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whether the defendants had the ability to “communicate” with and 
“provide updates” to their users “says nothing about whether 
[d]efendants facilitate[d] or enable[d] the exchange of copyrighted files 
at issue in these cases.”230 
For vicarious liability, although the court concluded that the 
defendants both received financial benefits through advertising money 
as a result of users flocking to their software programs, “there [was] no 
admissible evidence before the [c]ourt [that] indicat[ed] that 
[[d]efendants [had] the ability to supervise and control the infring[ing] 
conduct (all of which occur[ed] after the product has passed to end 
users).”231  Therefore, the district court held that the defendants were 
not vicariously liable.232 
b.  The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, which 
granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denied the 
plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment.233  The Ninth Circuit accepted 
all of the district court’s reasoning.234 
c.  The Supreme Court’s Opinion 
i.  The Majority’s Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and after much discussion of 
the case’s history, the majority opinion focused in on Sony.235  The 
majority noted that, “[a]lthough Sony’s advertisements urged consumers 
to buy the [Betamax] to ‘record favorite shows’ or ‘build a library’ of 
recorded programs, . . . neither of these uses was necessarily 
infringing.”236  Accordingly, “with no evidence of stated or indicated 
intent to promote infringing uses, the only conceivable basis for 
imposing liability was on a theory of contributory infringement” finding 
that Sony had “knowledge that some would use [the Betamax] to 
 
 230. Id. at 1042. 
 231. Id. at 1043–45. 
 232. See id. at 1046. 
 233. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 
2003), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 234. See id. 
 235. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931 
(2005). 
 236. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 459 
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); see Sony, 464 U.S. at 424, 454–55. 
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infringe.”237  However, the majority noted that the Court in Sony did not 
find Sony liable because the Betamax “was ‘capable of commercially 
significant noninfringing uses.’”238 
The majority then criticized the Ninth Circuit’s and district court’s 
views of Sony, describing them as “error” and holding that it was 
incorrect “to grant summary judgment to the [defendants-respondents] 
on [plaintiffs-petitioners’] inducement claim.”239  Moreover, the majority 
refused “to add a more quantified description” of the Staple Defense.240  
However, the majority did state that “where evidence goes beyond” a 
product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to 
infringing uses and shows statements or actions directed to promoting 
infringement—that is, taking “active steps . . . to encourage direct 
infringement”—Sony’s Staple Defense will not preclude liability.241  
Such promotion of infringement may be evidenced, for instance, by 
“advertising an infringing use, . . . instructing how to engage in an 
infringing use,” or “show[ing] an affirmative intent that the product be 
used to infringe [or] that infringement was encouraged.”242  As a result, 
the majority reasoned that it brought “the inducement rule” into 
copyright law “[f]or the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article 
doctrine [from] patent law.”243 
The majority reinforced its new stance by “holding that one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken 
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by 
third parties.”244  Furthermore, the majority explained that “mere 
knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not 
be enough [in this case] to subject a distributor to liability.”245  The 
majority was careful to list acts that were “incident[al] to product 
distribution,” for example, “offering customers technical support or 
 
 237. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439). 
 238. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442). 
 239. Id. at 934. 
 240. See id. 
 241. Id. at 935–36 (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 
(N.D. Ill. 1998)). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 936–37. 
 245. Id. at 937. 
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product updates,” and not steps of inducement—that is “purposeful, 
culpable expression and conduct.”246 
Next, the majority listed the affirmative steps that the defendants-
respondents took to induce users to infringe the plaintiffs-petitioners’ 
copyrights.247  Specifically, the majority found that Grokster did the 
following:  (1) “distributed an electronic newsletter containing links to 
articles promoting its software’s ability to access popular copyrighted 
music”; (2) released a program called “Swaptor,” which made Napster 
software compatible with its peer-to-peer networks; (3) edited the meta 
tags in its Web site’s html code to attract Web surfers searching for 
“Napster” vis-à-vis search engines; and (4) “Grokster’s name . . . [was] 
apparently derived from Napster.”248  Likewise, StreamCast (1) 
advertised “OpenNap,” which was its version of “Swaptor”; and (2) sent 
internal memorandums expressing their intentions to snag Napster’s 
users.249  In addition, the majority found that the defendants-
respondents’ failure to implement tools, which prevented infringement, 
“underscore[d] . . . [their] intentional facilitation of their users’ 
infringement.”250 
Moreover, the majority gave credence to the fact that the 
defendants-respondents’ business model depended on revenues from 
“high-volume use,” which was directly caused by infringing use.251  The 
majority noted that this factor alone was insufficient to find inducement, 
“but viewed in the context of the entire record its import [was] clear.”252  
In particular, it showed that the defendants-respondents had an 
“unlawful objective.”253 
ii.  Justice Ginsburg’s Concurring Opinion 
Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy joined Justice Ginsburg in her 
concurring opinion.254  Justice Ginsburg made the point that “the 
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate . . . a reasonable prospect that 
substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses were likely to 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at  937–40. 
 248. Id. at 938–39. 
 249. Id. at 939. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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develop over time.”255  Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg stated that the 
Ninth Circuit’s and district court’s finding that Grokster and StreamCast 
were capable of substantial noninfringing uses was incorrect.256 
iii.  Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion 
Justices Stevens and O’Connor joined Justice Breyer in his 
concurring opinion.257  First, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that 
active inducement was enough to find “the distributor of a dual-use 
technology” liable.258  Next, Justice Breyer addressed Sony.259  He noted 
that “of all the taping actually done by Sony’s customers, only around 
9% was of the sort the Court referred to as authorized.”260  Likewise, 
Justice Breyer found that the “10% [of uses] that apparently [were] 
noninfringing [were] very similar to the 9% or so of authorized time-
shifting uses of the” Betamax.261 
Moreover, in giving weight to the word “capable,” Justice Breyer 
stated “that a figure like 10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove 
insufficient, but that such a figure serve[d] as an adequate foundation 
where there [was] a reasonable prospect of expanded legitimate uses 
over time.”262  Next, he listed many of Grokster’s and SteamCast’s 
“legitimate noninfringing uses,” and Justice Breyer could “find nothing 
in the record that suggest[ed] that this course of events would not 
continue to flow naturally as a consequence of the character of the 
software taken together with the foreseeable development of the 
Internet and of information technology.”263  Furthermore, Justice Breyer 
concluded that “the foreseeable development of such uses, when taken 
together with an estimated 10% noninfringing material, [was] sufficient 
to meet Sony’s standard.”264  Finally, Justice Breyer noted that the Court 
should not alter the Staple Defense.265 
 
 255. Id. at 948. 
 256. Id. at 948–49. 
 257. See id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. Id. at 951. 
 261. Id. at 952. 
 262. Id. at 953. 
 263. Id. at 954–55. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 965. 
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II.  A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 
A.  Text of This Author’s Proposed Bill 
A BILL 
To amend chapter 5 of title 17, United States Code, relating to the 
Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine of copyright law, and for other 
purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1.  SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “Innovation Promotion and Copyright 
Protection Act of 2007.” 
SEC. 2.  THE STAPLE DEFENSE. 
Section 501 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following: 
(g) One who sells or distributes a product or service shall avoid 
secondary copyright liability if, after ninety days of distribution 
or sale of said product or service, sixty-six percent or more of the 
alleged secondarily infringing product’s or service’s uses are 
noninfringing. 
(h) One who sells or distributes a product or service shall be 
presumed to avoid secondary copyright liability if, after ninety 
days of distribution or sale of said product or service, ten percent 
or more of the alleged secondarily infringing product’s or 
service’s uses are noninfringing and one demonstrates that within 
six years, sixty-six percent or more of the alleged secondarily 
infringing product’s or service’s uses will be noninfringing. 
(1) This presumption shall be rebutted by a copyright owner 
if said copyright owner makes a showing that 
(i) after three years of the product’s or service’s sale or 
distribution, more than sixty-seven percent of the 
product’s or service’s uses are infringing; or 
(ii) after six years of the product’s or service’s sale or 
distribution, more than thirty-four percent of the 
product’s or service’s uses are infringing. 
(i) The statute of limitations for all actions under the Copyright 
Act shall toll during this six-year period for copyright actions 
where the alleged infringer affirms the Staple Defense any time 
within the six-year period aforementioned in subsection (h). 
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(j) This affirmative defense shall not be available to any seller or 
distributor of a product or service who invites others to infringe 
copyright protection vis-à-vis said seller’s or distributor’s product 
or service. 
(1) One invites others to infringe by advertising an infringing 
use, instructing how to engage in an infringing use, or 
showing an affirmative intent that the product be used to 
infringe.   
(k) If a court grants an alleged secondary infringer safe harbor 
under subsection (h) and, in a later action, said alleged secondary 
infringer is found liable for secondary liability because the 
copyright owner rebutted the presumption to avoid liability in 
the prior action under subsection (h)(1), then statutory damages 
for said liability shall be trebled. 
(l) In this section, the terms “secondary copyright liability” and 
“secondary liability” mean contributory infringement or 
vicarious liability in copyright law as described by the current 
judicial doctrine. 
B.  Legislative Intent of Proposed Bill 
After twenty-six years of case law, the current state of the Staple 
Defense is still uncertain and, more importantly, its future is unclear.  
First, the Sony Court, in a five to four decision, presented the broad 
principle, which was the initial embodiment of the Staple Defense.266  In 
unambiguous cases such as Vault Corp., where all current uses were 
found to be legal uses, applying the broad principle in Sony was 
frictionless.267  However, in cases where potential uses were present, but 
current infringement rates were high, the judiciary has struggled with 
applying the broad Sony principle on its own and, accordingly, has 
added its own ingredients into the recipe.268  The Supreme Court should 
have followed its own advice:  “Sound policy, as well as history, supports 
our consistent deference to Congress when major technological 
 
 266. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (5-4 
decision). 
 267. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 268. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (adding an inducement exception to the Staple 
Defense); id. at 947–48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (advocating to retain a case-by-case 
application of the broad Sony principle); id. at 952–53 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that a 
rate of ten percent in current noninfringing uses plus the reasonable prospect of more 
legitimate uses over time was sufficient to satisfy the Sony principle); In re Aimster Copyright 
Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (dicta) (adding a 
cost-benefit analysis to Sony’s Staple Defense). 
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innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.  Congress has 
the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate 
fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably 
implicated by such new technology.”269  The proposed legislation intends 
to avoid the aforementioned uncertainty by passing a bright-line rule 
that balances the copyright law’s policies, while maintaining the 
prospective viewpoint the Staple Defense currently embodies by 
implementing specific benchmarks for blossoming technologies to reach.  
Moreover, the proposed Innovation Promotion and Copyright 
Protection Act of 2007 (IPCP Act) does not overlap with proposed 
legislation and perpetuates a consistent approach for judicial application 
of the Staple Defense. 
1.  Bright-Line Rules Are Better than Uncertain Broad Principles 
Bright-line rules “are fairer than standards [in] that rules require 
decisionmakers to act consistently, treating like cases alike.”270  In 
particular, “rules reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by 
preventing decisionmakers from factoring the parties’ particular 
attractive or unattractive qualities into the decisionmaking calculus.”271  
Moreover, “rules afford certainty and predictability to private actors, 
enabling them to order their affairs productively.”272  In contrast, 
“[s]tandards produce uncertainty, thereby chilling socially productive 
behavior.”273  Standards do, however, allow decisionmakers great 
flexibility in rendering their decisions and thus standards “spare 
individuals from being sacrificed on the altar of rules.”274 
Professor Lawrence Lessig best answered the conundrum of whether 
the courts should continue to decide the fate of the peer-to-peer 
technology or whether Congress should pass decisive rules to make the 
determinations: 
If the answer is Congress, then innovators at least know their 
enemy.  Wars about liability get voted on; any resulting liability 
is usually prospective.  But if the answer is the courts, then 
innovators are forever at the mercy of enterprising lawyers.  It 
 
 269. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431. 
 270. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 
62 (1992); see also Renée Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Popular Revolt Against 
Proportionality in Self-Defense Law, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2007). 
 271. Sullivan, supra note 270, at 62. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 66. 
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takes nothing to ensnarl a startup in death-inducing legal bills, at 
least when the legal standard is uncertain.275 
2.  Balancing the Policies of Copyright Law 
Copyright legislation causes more harm than good if it does not 
properly balance the competing policies that copyright law is intended 
to serve.  Accordingly, this Comment explores both the traditional 
copyright law policies and those policies that have been molded out of 
technology’s entrance into the copyright realm. 
The U.S. Constitution gives “Congress . . . [the] Power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”276  The drafters clearly implemented an 
economic basis for copyright protection that was in great contrast to the 
European view that authors had an inherent, inalienable, personal right 
to their works.277  In fact, 
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause . . . is the conviction 
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the 
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors 
and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’  Sacrificial days 
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards 
commensurate with the services rendered.278 
Although the first purpose of the clause—and, thus, copyright law—is to 
“foster the creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the 
public welfare,” the secondary goal is “[t]o give authors the reward due 
them for their contribution to society.”279  Therefore, “the interests of 
authors must yield to the public welfare where they conflict.”280  
Furthermore, “[i]n enacting a copyright law, Congress must 
consider . . . two questions:  First, how much will the legislation 
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and second, how much 
will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?”281 
 
 275. Lawrence Lessig, A Rotten Ruling, WIRED MAG., Sept. 1, 2005, at 7, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.09/posts.html?pg=7. 
 276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8. 
 277. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, In Search of the Story:  Narratives of Intellectual 
Property, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 15 (2005). 
 278. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 279. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISION:  REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF 
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 3–6 (1961) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION REPORT]. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
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These policies have been more narrowly defined in the contexts of 
secondary liability and the application of the Staple Defense.  
Specifically, “a finding of contributory infringement is normally the 
functional equivalent of holding that the disputed article is within the 
monopoly granted to the patentee.”282  The Staple Defense, a legal 
device that shrinks the reach of the copyright holder’s protection, “must 
strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for 
effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly, 
and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas 
of commerce.”283  The Supreme Court folded “[t]he inducement rule” 
into the Staple Defense because such a rule “premises liability on 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to 
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a 
lawful promise.”284  In sum, protecting authors’ rights must be balanced 
with allowing new technologies to flourish, whereas too much protection 
would result in a “chilling effect” on innovation and too little protection 
would diminish the incentive for authors to create new works.285 
Accordingly, this Comment addresses how the IPCP Act balances 
the aforementioned policy issues.  First, the IPCP Act offers added 
bonuses to authors.286  In particular, a copyright owner may claim triple 
the damages that he or she could claim today if a manufacturer of a new 
technology takes safe harbor within the IPCP Act, but does not meet 
future noninfringement benchmarks within the three and six-year 
periods.  In addition, if the manufacturer invites others to infringe vis-à-
vis its technology, then that manufacturer waives its ability to affirm the 
codified Staple Defense.  These additions to the copyright owner’s 
rights will not extend the copyright owner’s monopoly to a point where 
it is detrimental to the public because the IPCP Act will stall litigation 
against new technologies, allowing the new technology to flourish, 
unless the amount of infringement is unreasonable—as defined by set 
infringement to noninfringement ratios.  If the new technology turns 
into a bastion of piracy, then triple damages compensate the copyright 
owner for his or her patience.  If the new technology develops into a 
 
 282. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 (1984) (5-4 
decision). 
 283. Id. at 442. 
 284. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005). 
 285. See Dan Pontes, Rewinding Sony:  Can the Supreme Court and Big Media Grok 
P2P?, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 159, 160 (2005). 
 286. For purposes of policy analysis, this Comment shall refer to authors and copyright 
owners interchangeably. 
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legitimately used one, then the technology developer benefits by having 
a lucrative asset and the copyright owner benefits by having a new 
technological medium to legitimately disseminate or reproduce his or 
her works. 
Likewise, manufacturers of new technologies receive added 
incentives.  Specifically, the IPCP Act offers an affirmative defense to 
vicarious liability, whereas, before the IPCP Act, the Staple Defense 
only applied to contributory infringement claims.  Furthermore, the 
IPCP Act offers set grace periods for technology to develop; however, 
during these periods there are limitations on the proportion of 
infringement that may occur.  These limits shrink over time so as to 
minimize the harm to copyright owners.  From a financial perspective, 
the flow of venture capital will increase into these technologies because 
careful business and technical planning can ensure that the technology 
keeps infringement within the lawful limits and, therefore, will make 
technologies such as peer-to-peer networking more attractive to 
potential financiers. 
Although the manufacturers of new technologies may come out 
slightly ahead of the copyright owners in the benefits they receive from 
the IPCP Act, “the interests of authors must yield to the public welfare 
where they conflict.”287  The public demands new technologies—as the 
authors do to disseminate their own works—and these demands must be 
met in a way that does as little damage as possible to copyright owners.  
Consequently, these added benefits to technology developers do not 
devalue the authors’ copyrights because direct infringement claims are 
still available to copyright owners and the DMCA grants copyright 
owners a windfall by remaining a powerful tool for them to use 
technology to protect their works by denying unauthorized access to 
third parties even if said third parties were attempting to execute a fair 
use of such works.  Finally, it should not be discounted that both the 
copyright owners and the technology developers will benefit from a 
more predictable and certain legal standard.  Accordingly, the copyright 
owners’ legal counsels will be able to more easily gauge when it is 
proper to bring litigation for secondary liability and the technology 
developers’ business planners will be able to ensure that safeguards exist 
in the technology to prevent widespread illegitimate uses. 
 
 287. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION REPORT, supra note 279, at 3–6. 
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3.  The Proposed Legislation Does Not Abandon the Weight Given to 
Potential Uses 
The proposed legislation takes into account the potential uses new 
technologies may have by slowly increasing the safe harbor 
requirements—the infringement to noninfringement ratio 
benchmarks—over a six-year period.  The intent behind this six-year 
period was that it was a long enough duration for society to realize 
whether the technology will become desirable—that is, have significant 
noninfringing uses.  At the outset, society will be willing to accept more 
infringement, but as time progresses to the close of the six-year period, 
society’s patience lessens; specifically, it will only bear thirty-four 
percent infringing uses.  Furthermore, the intent behind the 
infringement to noninfringement ratios is to maintain some consistency 
with the twenty-six years of judicial doctrine. 
The first safe harbor—that after ninety days of distribution or sale, 
at least sixty-six percent of uses must be noninfringing—stems from 
Justice Stevens’s reasoning in Sony that authorized time-shifting was a 
substantial enough use to justify applying the Staple Defense.288  As 
aforementioned, the floor of the range of authorized time-shifting was 
approximately sixty-six percent and the amount of authorized time-
shifting—although not expressly calculated by the majority—was 
sufficient to satisfy the Staple Defense on its own without any other 
legitimate uses of the device.289  There was no consideration of whether 
the amount of television programs that authorized time-shifting would 
increase over time, rather the Court found that the defendants-
petitioners established a substantial likelihood that a “substantial” 
amount of copyright owners “would not object to having their 
broadcasts time-shifted by private reviewers.”290  Consequently, the 
IPCP Act sets the benchmark for its most accommodating safe harbor 
to technologies that have at least sixty-six percent noninfringing uses.  
The author concedes that most infringement to noninfringement ratios 
will be somewhat arbitrary; however, this rate is consistent with Sony 
and it seems that technologies that have legitimate uses equal to 
approximately two-thirds of their total uses are the types of technologies 
that the Supreme Court contemplated the Staple Defense to protect.291  
After all, if the bar is raised much higher, the need and application for 
 
 288. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 289. See id. 
 290. Id. at 456. 
 291. See id. at 440–41. 
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such an affirmative defense would restrict the evolution of new 
technologies.  Moreover, because the IPCP Act does not apply the 
Staple Defense to technologies that innovators invite third parties to use 
to infringe copyrights, the probability that individuals would form 
Napster-like businesses with safeguards to ensure that only thirty-three 
percent of content is copyright protected would be very low.  That is, at 
a minimum those individuals would have to advertise this fact to third 
parties in order to make their technology popular for such purposes, and 
those individuals would have internal memoranda and business plans 
reflecting such nefarious goals. 
The second safe harbor—that after ninety days of distribution of 
sale, at least ten percent of uses must be noninfringing—accepts Justice 
Breyer’s reasoning in Grokster that “the foreseeable development of 
[noninfringing] uses, when taken together with an estimated 10% 
noninfringing material, is sufficient to meet Sony’s standard.”292  This 
safe harbor also requires that the alleged secondary infringer put forth 
evidence, such as business plans and market research reports, that he or 
she will reach the final infringement to noninfringement ratio at the end 
of six years.  This requirement ensures that Justice Breyer’s test of the 
current infringement rate is proper to use as a benchmark to measure a 
technology’s potential.  After all, a technology that has only ten percent 
noninfringing uses and no plan to improve that rate—or other evidence 
that the rate will improve—is not socially desirable.  This is not the end 
of the story, however, because after three years, the safe harbor will 
only remain available to technologies that have thirty-three percent 
noninfringing uses, and after six years, the safe harbor will only remain 
available to technologies that have sixty-six percent noninfringing uses. 
The intent behind the required ratio after six years is the same as that of 
the first safe harbor.  The thirty-three percent noninfringing uses after 
three years is merely the halfway benchmark to the requirements after 
six years. 
The aggregate effect of such safe harbors is in harmony with the 
policy behind the Staple Defense as evidenced by a consistency in the 
Sony and Grokster decisions, which emphasized the potential of a 
device.293  The case law could have developed in a much different 
 
 292. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 955 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 293. See id. at 931 (majority opinion) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 441); Sony, 464 U.S. at 
441 (determining whether the device was “capable of commercially significant noninfringing 
uses”). 
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direction if the four dissenting justices in Sony had prevailed.294  In 
particular, the dissent called for a modified Staple Defense, which only 
takes into account current uses of the allegedly infringing device.295  
Although this would greatly simplify the judiciary’s analysis, the test 
that the dissenting justices advocated for would suppress many new 
technologies. 
Often new technologies are developed for one use, but, over time, 
become commercially successful for alternate uses.  In fact, many 
products have become commercially successful because of newly 
discovered uses for those already existing products.296  Above all, 
copyright law had its own immaculate reception:  Sony—although it was 
the work of the Supreme Court and not Franco Harris and Terry 
Bradshaw.297  Specifically, the Court noted that the Betamax technology 
would spawn a time-shifting revolution and because such use—also its 
principal use—was fair, the Staple Defense would protect said 
technology.298  At the time the Court decided the case, “the industry was 
unsure how great the demand would be for prerecorded tapes compared 
to time shifting” so the “Betamax played one-hour tapes,” which were 
“long enough for most television broadcasts but too short for a feature 
film.”299  The Betamax’s competition distributed VHS technology, which 
had a “longer playing time” and “contributed to VHS’s eventual 
displacement of Betamax.”300  This opened up an entirely new market 
for the motion picture industry, which emphasizes why it is important to 
give credence to “potential” noninfringing uses.301  Moreover, if the 
Court had found time-shifting to be infringement—that is, not a fair 
use—then an entire domestic industry’s progression could have been 
slowed or hindered.  Accordingly, the IPCP Act is written to protect, for 
example, the start-up company’s software program that the company 
developed for a legitimate use, but that became popular and widely 
disseminated for third-parties’ illegitimate uses, provided that the 
 
 294. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 295. See id. 
 296. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA:  The 
Politics of AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771, 788 n.57 (1989) (noting that Zidovudine 
was an ineffective cancer drug that many years later became the first federally approved 
AIDS drug). 
 297. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417. 
 298. See id. at 421. 
 299. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
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company then took steps to ensure that the legitimate uses govern and 
dominate.  In sum, the IPCP Act is not only for the businesses that 
intend legitimate uses for their products and put safeguards into their 
devices or systems to prevent infringement; it also serves to protect the 
devices or systems that, by chance, become popular for infringing uses 
as long as the technology developer then ensures that legitimate uses 
become substantial—that is, reach the infringement ratio benchmarks 
over the six-year period after the product’s initial release. 
4.  Specific Times, Limits, and Infringement Ratios Define Whether or 
Not Technologies Are Socially Desirable 
The Supreme Court found justification for importing secondary 
liability into copyright law by applying broad principles often used to 
settle similarly fashioned disputes in most other areas of tort law.302  This 
author looks to other areas of the law for justifying liability against 
manufacturers of products, which may have some legitimate uses, but 
those uses are far outweighed by socially undesirable uses. 
Traditional tort law has long punished the manufacturers of products 
that had some socially desirable uses, but were “unreasonably 
dangerous” to consumers.303  For instance, section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts states: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused 
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation 
and sale of his product, and 
 
 302. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) 
(holding the defendant liable on principles recognized in every part of the law)) (noting that 
vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory 
infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of when to hold one individual 
accountable for the actions of another). 
 303. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (1965) (historical 
discussion of such strict liability). 
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(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.304 
The comment to the Restatement states that where the 
manufacturer “has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a 
particular use . . . he may be required to give adequate warning of the 
danger . . . and a product sold without such warning is in a defective 
condition.”305  By providing adequate warning, the manufacturer takes 
affirmative steps to prevent harm caused by its product.  Regretfully, a 
consumer has more incentive to abide by a warning that affects said 
consumer’s well-being than a consumer who is warned that his or her 
actions may economically harm a third-party copyright holder.  By 
analogy, a technology developer must safeguard his or her product to 
prevent its users from infringing via said product in order to retain 
eligibility in the IPCP Act’s safe harbors.  Even if there are minimal 
noninfringing uses—that is, up to ten percent—at the outset of the 
development, the developer must either rely on fate or take affirmative 
steps to ensure that the harm caused to copyright holders does not 
exceed a minimum point over time—thirty-four percent infringing uses.  
Proper business and technical planning allows the technology developer 
to keep control over his or her product to minimize harm to copyright 
holders.  Furthermore, the technology developer needs not to fear 
asserting such control, as the IPCP Act provides an absolute safe harbor 
from secondary copyright liability as long as he or she abides by the safe 
harbor provisions. 
To explain the reasonableness of the IPCP Act, analogies must be 
drawn.  For example, if ninety percent of vaccine users died, then the 
vaccine should be kept around for future development, but only under a 
watchful eye.306  If after years of research and development, the fatality 
rate significantly decreases, then it becomes socially desirable.  
Likewise, if a dog bites its owner as a puppy, it is forgiven; however, 
when that puppy grows into a dog and it repeats the same behavior, it 
needs to be put down.  Moreover, if that dog bites the neighbors—third 
parties—then the dog’s social desirability becomes even less.  This is the 
concept that is echoed in the IPCP Act. 
 
 304. Id. § 402A. 
 305. Id. § 402A cmt. h. 
 306. Although vaccines may qualify as “[u]navoidably unsafe products,” the 
Restatement still requires proper warning to parties that may be harmed by the product.  See 
id. § 402A cmt. k. 
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Aside from the aforementioned Restatement provision, courts have 
subjected manufacturers to liability when their products are chiefly used 
for nefarious purposes and, thus, were socially undesirable.307  For 
example, Maryland’s highest court held that if “the trier of fact 
determines that a handgun is a Saturday Night Special, then liability 
may be imposed against a manufacturer or anyone else in the marketing 
chain, including the retailer . . . when the plaintiff or plaintiff’s decedent 
suffers injury or death because he is shot with the Saturday Night 
Special” as part of “a criminal act.”308 
The term “Saturday Night Special” refers to “a particular category 
of small, cheap handguns,” which are “regularly used in criminal 
activity.”309  An academic wrote that because these guns are “easily 
concealable and relatively inexpensive,” they “pose a great risk of 
criminal misuse” and, therefore, “any countervailing social usefulness is 
negligible because the poor quality of their manufacture precludes their 
use for most legitimate purposes.”310  Furthermore, alternative guns 
serve the “legitimate uses, while not posing the same danger of criminal 
misuse.”311  The court reasoned that “the manufacturer or marketer of a 
Saturday Night Special knows or ought to know that the chief use of the 
product is for criminal activity,” and “[s]uch criminal use, and the virtual 
absence of legitimate uses for the product, [were] clearly foreseeable by 
the manufacturers and sellers of” the product.312 
Like the manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials, Napster, 
Aimster, Grokster, and Streamcast “kn[ew] or ought to [have] know[n] 
that the chief use of the product[s] [was] for” illegitimate activity.313  
Such knowledge was established by, inter alia, actual knowledge of 
infringement, their advertising campaigns for users to download their 
software programs to get access to copyrighted works, and internal 
memoranda.314  The difference between these peer-to-peer networks and 
Saturday Night Specials is the potential for “legitimate uses for the 
 
 307. See, e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985). 
 308. Id. at 1160. 
 309. Id. at 1146. 
 310. Id. at 1158–59 (citations omitted). 
 311. Id. (citations omitted). 
 312. Id. at 1159 (citations omitted). 
 313. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 
(2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 
F. Supp. 2d 896, 918, 920–21 (N.D. Cal. 2000)); Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1159. 
 314. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37; In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650; Napster, 239 F.3d 
at 1022 (citing Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918, 920–21). 
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product.”315  If the court made a finding that Saturday Night Specials 
were primarily used by poor individuals and shopkeepers for self-
defense and defense of their properties, then the court would likely have 
overlooked the criminal activity associated with the guns.  Accordingly, 
the IPCP Act allows for technologies, like peer-to-peer networks, to 
flourish and establish themselves as legitimately used products.  In 
short, the technology developer needs to aim to be more like Colt 
Firearms Company and less like a Saturday Night Special manufacturer.  
In particular, society is willing to allow large portions of infringement in 
the blossoming years of a new technology as long as that technology’s 
business model is not based on infringement and the technology 
developer does not advertise its use as a tool of infringement.  Then, 
after a set period of time—three years and six years—and as long as the 
proportion of legitimate uses to illegitimate uses increases—eventually 
achieving a proportion of sixty-six percent noninfringing uses to thirty-
four percent infringing uses—society will embrace the new technology 
and will not punish the developer of it because a minority of third 
parties illegitimately use the technology.  This is analogous to society’s 
embrace of non-Saturday Night Special firearms because of their 
legitimate uses for hunting, self-defense, and defense of one’s property, 
even though said firearms are often used by criminals. 
5.  Other Proposed Legislation Has Not Addressed the Issues 
Addressed in the Legislation Proposed Here 
Senator Orrin Hatch introduced the Inducing Infringement of 
Copyrights Act of 2004,316 but the bill died during that session in 
committee.317  The bill read as follows: 
Section 501 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following: 
 (g)(1) In this subsection, the term ‘intentionally induces’ 
means intentionally aids, abets, induces, or procures, and 
intent may be shown by acts from which a reasonable person 
would find intent to induce infringement based upon all 
relevant information about such acts then reasonably 
available to the actor, including whether the activity relies on 
infringement for its commercial viability. 
 
 315. See Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1159 (citations omitted). 
 316. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 317. See 150 CONG. REC. S7174-02 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (bill proposed by Sen. 
Hatch). 
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 (2) Whoever intentionally induces any violation identified 
in subsection (a) shall be liable as an infringer. 
 (3) Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish 
the doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability for 
copyright infringement or require any court to unjustly 
withhold or impose any secondary liability for copyright 
infringement.318 
First, the Staple Defense would not have applied to infringement 
under this amendment, so new technologies that would not have fallen 
under this amendment, but would have been subject to contributory 
liability would continue to struggle over the uncertainty encumbered by 
the Staple Defense.319  Second, this broadly drafted amendment to the 
Copyright Act would have increased the secondary liability doctrines in 
copyright law.  It is unclear by how much this amendment would 
broaden the scope of the copyright holder’s monopoly; however, the 
words “aids” and “abets” could lead to judicial ensnarement of many 
new technologies.320  This author questions whether the Betamax would 
have survived such language because Sony, through its agents, 
advertised “library building,” which was clearly an infringing use of 
Sony’s product.321  Accordingly, such advertisements may have caused 
copyright owners to argue that Sony aided, abetted, or induced its 
customers to infringe.  Furthermore, because, approximately 44.2% of 
users owned eleven or more Betamax tapes, a strong argument could 
have been made that a significant portion of Betamax users operated 
their Betamaxes for “library building” and, therefore, Sony relied on the 
infringement for its commercial viability.322  Whether commercial 
viability refers to that of the product or that of the enterprise is unclear 
from the text of the amendment; accordingly, this amendment would 
have caused more uncertainty in this area of the law.  In contrast, the 
IPCP Act incorporates the concept of inducement as a waiver of the 
Staple Defense—consistent with the Court’s decision in Grokster and 
not as broad as Hatch’s proposed amendment—because one who invites 
infringement becomes ineligible for the Staple Defense.323 
 
 318. See 150 CONG. REC. S7189-02 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 319. See id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 436 (C.D. 
Cal. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963, (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 322. See id. at 438.  When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their 
libraries, 55.8% said there were ten or less.  Id. 
 323. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 
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6.  The Proposed Legislation Is Consistent with the Aforementioned 
Case Law 
In furtherance of the positive effects caused by creating a more 
certain and clear rule for technology innovators to follow, the IPCP Act 
would also dictate consistent outcomes with the important judicial 
decisions outlined above.  First, Sony would likely have had the same 
outcome because it would have reached the first safe harbor’s 
benchmark at the outset of the technology’s distribution, or if it had 
happened to miss the safe harbor, the technology later progressed 
enough with users watching movies they bought, rented, or made at 
home to reach the second safe harbor’s benchmarks at three and six 
years.324  The only point of doubt would be whether the copyright 
owners presented strong enough evidence that the Betamax was 
advertised for home users to build libraries and, thus, invited others to 
infringe.325  Optimistically speaking, Sony would probably not have 
allowed such advertisements if the IPCP Act had been passed by 
Congress.  However, advertising to build a library may not have been 
infringing conduct if Sony argued that it only advertised for its users to 
build a library consisting of authorized programming.  Consequently, 
under the proposed legislation, Sony could have come out the other way 
if the Court felt that such advertising was sufficient to invite 
infringement, but it is more likely that the Court would have come out 
the same way because such conduct may not have been infringement, 
and the primary business model and advertising campaign relied on 
time-shifting as the primary use of the product. 326 
Second, RCA Records would have had the same outcome because 
the IPCP Act does not protect operators of new technologies, only 
manufacturers and developers.327  Next, Vault Corp. would have come 
out the same because all of the technology’s uses were legal and were 
the advertised uses of the technology.328 
Finally, all the peer-to-peer technology cases would have come out 
the same—that is, against the developer of the technology—because 
 
(2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 324. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); In re 
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650. 
 325. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 436. 
 326. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 453. 
 327. See RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 328. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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each of those developers invited third parties to infringe copyrights vis-
à-vis their peer-to-peer technologies.329  Without those bad equities, 
however, those technology developers likely would have satisfied one of 
the IPCP Act’s safe harbors by having ten percent noninfringing uses 
after ninety days of distribution and, thus, would have been able to 
distribute the technology for at least three years.  The future of these 
technologies would have depended on the progressions after the three 
and six-year periods described in the IPCP Act.  However, these 
technologies may have had much different life cycles if their business 
models were not based on infringement; so having the three-year grace 
period would not likely have been as harmful to copyright owners as, for 
example, letting the Napster of our time operate with carte blanche for 
three years. 
CONCLUSION 
Unless third parties cease using innovative technologies 
nefariously—that is, pirating copyrighted works rather than purchasing 
them—then the courts can anticipate struggling to apply the current 
version of the Staple Defense.  Instead of waiting for new judicial 
pronouncements, Congress should consider legislation resembling the 
IPCP Act.  Although Congress should institute findings regarding the 
effects that the benchmarks will have on innovators and authors, the 
Staple Defense’s uncertain progression from Sony, a five to four 
decision, to Grokster, a decision with two concurrences reflecting 
conflicting rationales, is clear evidence of the need for such legislative 
change. 
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